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1 Introduction
Many economists believe that introducing competition is the key to achiev-
ing the full benefits of privatization in previously monopolized and regulated
network industries, such as telecommunications, electricity or railways.1 The
recent wave of “deregulation” in these industries – i.e. the introduction
of competition into statutory monopolies – is consistent with this view.
The traditional approach towards introducing downstream competition in
network industries has been to break up the integrated dominant firm and
prohibit the upstream monopolist to reenter the downstream market. Well-
known divestures of this type include the breakup of AT&T in the United
States in 1984 and the breakup of British Rail in Great Britain in 1994. In
a similar vein, the District Court Judge recently ordered the breakup of Mi-
crosoft during the ongoing antitrust litigation in the case United States v.
Microsoft. A somewhat less radical approach – often adopted in the 1990’s
by European countries deregulating their national telecommunications mar-
kets – allows the upstream monopolist to remain integrated and attempts
to create a level playing field for the downstream competitors by regulating
the access prices.2 Yet another approach was adopted in the recent deregu-
lation of the German electricity industry, where market structure regulations
have been removed altogether and access charges are freely determined by
the industry.
Industrial organization theory suggests that irrespective of the particular
approach adopted, the introduction of imperfect downstream competition in
network industries with natural monopoly characteristics upstream is subject
to the following potential problems:
• double marginalization: the introduction of imperfect downstream com-
petition leads to successive markups which imply higher prices for the
final good and lower aggregate welfare;3
1See Newbery (1997) for a recent survey on the state of the debate.
2See Laﬀont and Tirole (1996) for a survey of the problem of one-way interconnection
relevant for the problem considered here.
3The classic reference is Spengler (1950); Tirole (1988, Chapter 4) and Perry (1989)
provide surveys on market outcomes in vertically related industries.
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• underinvestment : downstream competition tends to reduce the monop-
olist’s incentive to invest in network quality or cost reductions;4
• vertical foreclosure: when competing with new entrants the monopo-
list may have incentives to raise downstream rivals’ cost by charging
excessive wholesale or access prices.5
Somewhat surprisingly, regulators and antitrust authorities have rarely
addressed these issues when breaking up the vertically integrated monopoly
structure, even though the extensive literature on interconnection is either
explicitly or implicitly based on the problem of vertical foreclosure.
This paper takes the potential drawbacks of market structure regulation
seriously and studies both pricing and investment behavior of a network
monopolist under the most common forms of market structure regulation,
namely (i) vertical integration without downstream competition (ii) verti-
cal separation, where the upstream monopolist is fully separated from the
imperfectly competitive downstream market, and (iii) liberalization, where
the upstream monopolist is allowed to operate in the imperfectly compet-
itive downstream market. We consider network industries producing final
products that are imperfect substitutes. More specifically, we will assume
that the eﬀect of a price increase on own demand dominates the eﬀects on
competitors’ demands. As a consequence, our analysis is best applied to
industries with highly diﬀerentiated final products where downstream com-
petition is imperfect and possibly not very intense. In industries with only
weakly diﬀerentiated products, the drawbacks of regulating market structure
discussed in this paper are also present, but they are typically dominated
by the positive eﬀects generated by the introduction of fierce downstream
competition.
Our main results are the following. First, under reasonable assumptions
on demand, retail prices are higher under vertical separation and liberaliza-
tion than under vertical integration. This follows from the fact that under
4See Buehler et al. (2000) for an analysis of the monopolist’s incentives to invest in
infrastructure quality.
5See Klass and Salinger (1995) for a survey on the theory of vertical foreclosure and its
antitrust implications. Riordan (1998) and Ordover et al. (1990) provide further references
and critical reviews of recent contributions.
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separation and liberalization, the network monopolist has an incentive to set
its access prices higher than the retail prices under integration, because the
industry’s (partial) separation reduces the perceived price elasticity of the
monopolist’s demand. Second, since the monopolist’s incentives to invest in
cost reduction are driven by aggregate demand for the intermediate good,
marginal cost is higher under separation and liberalization than under inte-
grated monopoly (under the demand assumptions mentioned above). This
result reinforces higher prices under deregulation. Third, an exogenously im-
posed change of the vertical market structure from integration to separation
or liberalization turns out to be welfare decreasing. Fourth, using a sim-
ple example with a linear demand system, we demonstrate that the network
monopolist does not necessarily wish to foreclose its downstream rivals un-
der liberalization. In fact, the monopolist’s incentive to discriminate against
his downstream competitors may even increase the competitiveness of the
industry relative to vertical separation, in particular when the number of
competitors is high.
Hence, if regulatory and antitrust authorities are in fact aiming at lower
retail prices and thus higher social welfare, they may find the breakup of a
dominant vertically integrated firm undesirable. Of course, carefully crafted
(access) price regulations may help to control the monopolist’s market power
under vertical separation or liberalization, but it is not evident that con-
taining the monopolist’s market power is easier or less costly than under
integration. It therefore remains to be explained by models of political econ-
omy why it seems to be a standard practice to replace vertically integrated
monopolists with regulated retail prices by (partially) separated upstream
monopolist with regulated access prices.
This paper deviates from previous work in several respects. First, the
present analysis covers not only vertical integration and separation, but also
liberalization as diﬀerent types of market structure regulation. Earlier papers
by Greenhut and Ohta (1976 and 1978), Perry (1978) and Haring and Kaser-
man (1978) focus on the comparison of vertical integration and separation
and essentially show that vertical integration lowers retail prices in the case of
homogenous Cournot competition downstream. Second, we study Bertrand
competition with horizontally diﬀerentiated final goods and fairly general
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demand functions. Recent studies by Vickers (1995) and Lee and Hamilton
(1999) investigate the pros and cons of a regulated monopolist’s downstream
participation in an industry with Cournot competition downstream. Third,
we study strategic third-degree price discrimination by the network monopo-
list in each regulatory regime, thereby allowing for vertical foreclosure. Sibley
and Weisman (1998) investigate the incentives of an upstream monopolist to
foreclose its competitors in the Cournot market downstream and apply their
analysis to the telecommunications industry. Mandy and Sappington (2000)
point out that the incentive of a regulated upstream monopolist to disad-
vantage or “sabotage” downstream rivals using non-price strategies crucially
depends on the nature of downstream competition, i.e. Cournot v. Bertrand.
Fourth, throughout the paper, we abstract from access or retail price regu-
lations, both in the benchmark case of vertical integration and the cases of
separation and liberalization, thus isolating the eﬀects generated by market
structure regulations. Using our results, we discuss the potential role that
price regulations might play in the industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the
basic setup of the model. It discusses the main assumptions on demand for
the final good and outlines the cost structure of the various firms. Section 3
develops the case of vertical integration as a benchmark. Section 4 compares
equilibrium prices and investment under vertical separation and integration.
Section 5 analyzes the case of liberalization and compares its equilibrium
outcome with vertical integration and separation. Section 6 discusses the
welfare implications of changes in vertical market structure. Section 7 pro-
vides a simple example with a linear demand system. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Basic Setup
Wemodel the production and selling of a diﬀerentiated final product provided
over a network as an industry with a vertical structure. Suppose that in
order to produce the final good (e.g. electricity or internet services), the
seller needs access to an intermediate good produced by a monopolist. For
simplicity, assume that to provide one unit of the final product (e.g. one
kWh or one internet browser), one unit of the homogenous intermediate
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good (e.g. one kWh of access or one PC operating system) is required. The
diﬀerentiated final product is sold on nmarkets with an individual downward-
sloping demandDi(p), i = 1, ..., n, where p = (p1, ..., pn) is the vector of retail
prices set on the various markets. Aggregate demand for the intermediate
good is thus given byD(p) ≡
Pn
i=1Di(p). The variable cost c(e) of providing
the intermediate good depends on the level of eﬀort e that is exerted by the
network operator to reduce this cost; implementing a nonnegative eﬀort is
costly, which is reflected in a convex cost function ψ(e). Finally, suppose
that there is a fixed cost F of operating the network.
In the various industry configurations, we model the provision of the final
good as a simple two-stage game with the following course of events (see Fig.
1).
• Stage 1: The network monopolist chooses both the cost-reducing eﬀort
e and an access tariﬀ ai for each of the downstream firms i.
• Stage 2: Observing the access tariﬀs ai, each downstream firm i sets
the retail price pi for the provision of the final good, taking the retail
prices pj , j 6= i, as given.
Observe that in the case of vertical integration, the network operator is
also owner of the retail firms i = 1, ..., n and thus faces a simple optimization
problem. In the case of vertical separation, the network operator and the
downstream competitors play a sequential game which can be solved using
backward induction. In the case of liberalization, where the network oper-
ator is vertically integrated with one or more downstream firms but faces
downstream competitors, a sequential game between the integrated network
operator and its downstream competitors is played. The outcomes of these
sequential games clearly depend on the market structure and the intensity of
downstream competition, in particular on the degree to which the final prod-
ucts are diﬀerentiated and whether the vertically integrated network operator
can foreclose its downstream competitors by imposing a “price squeeze”, i.e.
by raising the competitors’ access prices and lowering its own retail price.
We will pursue these arguments in more detail in the following sections.
Throughout the paper, we require that in the vicinity of the equilibrium,
the following basic assumptions are satisfied:
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Figure 1: Diﬀerent types of market structure
[A 1] ∂Di(p)/∂pi < 0, ∂Di(p)/∂pj ≥ 0, i, j = 1, ..., n, i 6= j; this implies that
the final products are substitutes. In addition, we make the standard
assumption that demand is not too convex.6
[A 2] ∂D(p)/∂pi = ∂Di(p)/∂pi +
P
j 6=i ∂Dj(p)/∂pi < 0, i, j = 1, ..., n; we
thus assume that own demand eﬀects dominate eﬀects on competitors’
demands; this condition implies that the final products are imperfect
substitutes and competition is not very intense, i.e. our analysis is best
applied to vertically related industries producing highly diﬀerentiated
final products.7
[A 3] This assumption imposes two important conditions for the case of (par-
tial) vertical separation. They essentially require that the final prod-
ucts remain substitutes from the monopolist’s point of view when the
industry is vertically separated.
6More precisely, “not too convex” means that the condition ρii ≥ 1 − εii is satisfied,
where εii is the own price elasticity of demand in market i, and ρii is the elasticity of the
price elasticity. See the proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix for further details
7Note that if final products are close substitutes, the advantages of introducing down-
stream competition usually dominate the drawbacks of the industry’s (partial) vertical
separation.
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(i)
P
j (∂Di(p)/∂pj) (∂pj/∂ai) < 0, i, j = 1, ..., n; this implies that an
increase of the access price for market i leads to a decrease of
demand for good i (accounting for all cross-price eﬀects).
(ii)
P
k,j 6=i (∂Dj(p)/∂pk) (∂pk/∂ai) > 0, i, j, k = 1, ..., n; this condi-
tions assures that an increase of the access price for market i leads
to an increase of demand for good j (accounting for all cross-price
eﬀects).
[A 4] c0(e) < 0, c00(e) > 0 (positive, decreasing reduction of cost with higher
eﬀort).
[A 5] ψ0(e) > 0,ψ00(e) > 0 (positive, increasing cost of providing eﬀort).
We now investigate the equilibrium outcomes under the various types of
market structure regulation.
3 Vertical Integration
Suppose that there is a vertically integrated monopolist whose divisions i =
1, ..., n serve all markets with demand Di(p) for the final good. It is well
known that a monopolist serving diﬀerent demands is at least as well-oﬀ
under third-degree price discrimination as under uniform pricing, since “at
worst” he can always charge a uniform price (Tirole 1988, 137). Only if price
discrimination is impossible – e.g. due to regulatory prescriptions requiring
uniform retail prices (as is often the case for universal service) or arbitrage
possibilities between the diﬀerent markets – will an integrated monopolist
set a uniform linear tariﬀ.8 Let us therefore assume that the integrated
monopolist sets a market price pIi for each division i = 1, ..., n.
9 Its profit
8Throughout the paper we will assume that the monopolist is not able to further
discriminate costumers in market i, i.e. it must set a linear retail price.
9It is straightforward to show that if the integrated monopolist is restricted to set a
uniform retail price pi = p¯ for all markets i, the profit maximizing retail price p¯I is given
by the standard Lerner index, and the optimum eﬀort satisfies −c0(eInd)D(p¯I) = ψ
0(eInd),
where the subscript nd denotes ‘no price discrimination’.
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maximizing problem is then given by
max
p,e
ΠI(p, e) =
nX
i=1
[pi − c(e)]Di (p)− ψ (e)− F.
The first-order conditions for equilibrium prices pIi and equilibrium eﬀort eI
are then given by
pIi − c(eI)
pIi
=
1
εii(pI)
−
P
j 6=i[p
I
j − c(eI)]Dj(pI)εji(pI)
Ri(pI)εii(pI)
, i, j = 1, ..., n,
(1)
and
−c0(eI)D(pI) = ψ0(eI), (2)
with
εii ≡ −
(∂Di/∂pi)pi
Di
> 0, εji ≡ −
(∂Dj/∂pi)pi
Dj
< 0
denoting the own-price-elasticity of demand in division i, and the cross-price
elasticity of demand in division j with respect to the price in division i, re-
spectively.10 Ri ≡ piDi is the revenue of division i, and pI is the vector of
equilibrium retail prices. To be sure, (1) is nothing else than the familiar
Lerner index for a multiproduct monopoly with separable costs and depen-
dent demands (see e.g. Tirole 1988, 70), where both demands and elasticities
are evaluated at the equilibrium retail prices pI . It is important to note that
a vertically integrated monopolist takes into account that the final products
oﬀered by its diﬀerent divisions are substitutes (εji < 0) and thus sets higher
markups than each of its division would set individually. A preliminary com-
parative statics result now follows immediately.
Lemma 1 Suppose the industry is vertically integrated and the monopolist
is discriminating its retail prices. Then the cost-reducing eﬀort is decreasing
in the retail prices, i.e. deI/dpIi < 0, i = 1, ..., n.
Proof. See Appendix.
10Observe that these elasticities have the conventional signs for imperfect substitutes
given in Tirole (1988, 70).
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The intuition for this result is straightforward. Aggregate demand for the
intermediate good is decreasing in each retail price pIi . The cost reductions
generated by an eﬀort eI thus apply to a smaller overall demand the higher
each retail price is. Consequently, the upstream monopolist’s incentives to
exert eﬀort are reduced when retail prices goes up. We shall see that versions
of this result emerge under the various market configurations considered in
this paper. Let us now turn to the case of vertical separation.
4 Vertical Separation
Under vertical separation, there is an upstream network monopolist and a
set of downstream firms i = 1, ..., n forming an oligopoly fully separated
from network operation. Given the access charge ai chosen by the upstream
monopolist and the vector of retail prices pS−i = (p
S
1 , ..., p
S
i−1, p
S
i+1, ..., p
S
n) set
by all other vertically separated downstream firms, firm i chooses its retail
price so as to
max
pi
Πi(p, ai) = [pi − ai]Di
¡
pi,p
S
−i
¢
.
The equilibrium retail price pSi is thus given by
pSi − aSi
pSi
= − Di(p
S)
∂Di(pS)/∂pi · pSi
≡ 1εii(pS)
, i = 1, ..., n, (3)
where εii is again the own-price-elasticity of demand for firm i’s services,
but now evaluated at pS instead of pI . Given the vector of access prices
a = (a1, ..., an) from the game’s first stage, the equilibrium retail prices pSi (a)
in the second stage are functions of these access prices and characterized by
the best-response functions
pbi(ai,p
S
−i) = p
S
i , i = 1, ..., n.
If we denote the vector of equilibrium retail prices by pS(a) = (pS1 (a), ..., p
S
n(a)),
the upstream firm’s problem can be written as
max
a,e
ΠU(a, e) =
nX
i=1
[ai − c (e)]Di(pS(a))− ψ (e)− F,
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with
Pn
i=1Di(p
S(a)) ≡ D(pS(a)) denoting aggregate demand for the inter-
mediate product. The first-order condition for equilibrium access prices is
then given by
aSi − c(eS)
aSi
= − Di(p
S)
aSi
P
j
∂Di(pS)
∂pj
∂pj(aS)
∂ai| {z }
(+)
−
P
j 6=i
£
aSj − c(eS)
¤
Dj
P
k
∂Dj(pS)
∂pk
∂pk(aS)
∂ai
aSi
P
j
∂Di(pS)
∂pj
∂pj(aS)
∂ai| {z }
(+)
,
(4)
for i, j, k = 1, ..., n, where the indicated signs follow from assumption [A 3].
Let us simplify this result using the above definitions of εii and εji, as well
as the elasticities of retail prices with respect to access charge ai given by
mji ≡
(∂pj/∂ai) ai
pj
and mki ≡
(∂pk/∂ai) ai
pk
.
In addition, let R˜i ≡ aiDi denote the monopolist’s revenue from product i
under vertical separation. First-order condition (4) then simplifies to
aSi − c
¡
eS
¢
aSi
= E1(p
S, aS) + E2(p
S, aS), (5)
with
E1(p
S, aS) =
1P
j εij(pS)mji(aS)
denoting the inverse price elasticity of demand for a vertically separated
upstream monopolist serving market i only, and
E2(p
S,aS) = −
P
j 6=i[a
S
j − c(eS)]Dj(pS)
P
k εjk(pS)mki(aS)
R˜i(pS)
P
j εij(pS)mji(aS)
denoting the pricing externalities to markets j 6= i, which are internalized
by a monopolist serving all n markets. While the first-order condition for
equilibrium eﬀort
−c0(eS)D(pS(aS)) = ψ0(eS) (6)
has the same form as under integration, equilibrium access prices aS =
(aS1 , ..., a
S
n) are now given by a generalized form of the Lerner index for a
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multimarket monopoly with additively separable costs and dependent de-
mands. First-order condition (5) indicates that since the monopolist is now
unable to set retail prices and thus unable to aﬀect demand directly, profit
maximization dictates that the monopolist must account for the fact that his
price variations in market i are first translated into retail price variations by
mji before they aﬀect demand over εij. More specifically, equation (5) shows
that the industry’s vertical separation changes the pricing incentives of the
network monopolist relative to the case of integration (see (1)) in two related
ways:
(i) It changes the inverse price elasticity of demand for a monopolist serv-
ing market 1 only from 1/εii(pI) to E1(pS, aS). Instead of directly af-
fecting demand via εii(pI), an increase of the monopolist’s price ai first
aﬀects the pricing decisions of the downstream firms via the elasticities
of retail prices mii and mji. Only through the associated changes of re-
tail prices does an increase of ai aﬀect the demand for the final good i.
We will show in Lemma 2 that firm i will generally not find it optimal
to fully pass on the increase of ai to its costumers, i.e. mii ≤ 1.11 At
the same time, firm i’s competitors producing diﬀerentiated products
welcome the increase of ai since it allows them to adjust their prices
pSj , j 6= i, upwards. Lemma 2 will show that the elasticities mji, j 6= i,
are in fact positive, thereby mitigating the substitution eﬀects gener-
ated by the price increase for firm i. As a consequence, from the point
of view of a vertically separated upstream monopolist serving market
i only, the perceived price elasticity of demand is smaller than under
integration, and the corresponding monopoly price will therefore be
higher.12
(ii) It changes the pricing externalities between markets that a monopolist
serving all n markets is internalizing (compare the second term on the
right-hand side of (1) with E2(pS, aS)). As under vertical integration,
11Remember that mii is an elasticity, i.e. it measures the change of pi in response to a
marginal increase of ai.
12Rey and Stiglitz (1995) point out a similar eﬀect when oligopolistic upstream producers
implement exclusive territories downstream in order to reduce interbrand competition.
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the upstream monopolist accounts for the externalities between the
markets i and j, j 6= i, when setting its prices. But just as within each
market, variations of the access prices now only indirectly aﬀect the de-
mand for the final good. An increase of the access price ai now generates
demand eﬀects – if any – in markets j 6= i only after translation via
mji and mki into changes of retail prices and then into demand by εji
and εjk. Whether vertical separation increases or decreases the pricing
externalities between markets appears to be ambiguous in general.
It is well known that in an imperfectly competitive industry, vertical
separation introduces a double marginalization provided the prices for the
intermediate and the final good are linear. As a consequence, each equilib-
rium retail price pSi (a
S
i ) features a double markup which increases the retail
price under vertical separation relative to the price pIi (c(e)) under vertical
integration.13 Note, however, that for a given level of marginal cost, there
is also a countervailing eﬀect stemming from the introduction of downstream
competition: The separated downstream firms now compete with each other
and are not able to account for the pricing externalities between the diﬀer-
ent markets, i.e. they set lower retail prices than an integrated monopoly
(εji < 0) would set.
To compare the market outcomes under vertical integration and separa-
tion, we need to study the conditions for which equilibrium retail prices are
higher under separation than integration, i.e. pSi (a
S
i (e
S)) > pIi (c(e
I)), ∀i. To
simplify, we proceed in two steps. First, we compare the equilibrium retail
prices pSi (a
S
i ) and p
I
i (c) under integration and separation, holding the eﬀort
level constant. Second, we study the incentives to exert cost reducing eﬀort
in each market configuration.
4.1 Equilibrium Retail Prices for Given Eﬀort
To begin with, suppose that the eﬀort level is fixed at e ≡ e¯. A suﬃcient con-
dition for the retail prices being higher under separation than integration (i.e.
13Of course, this double markup may be very small if final goods are close substitutes
and downstream competition is thus intense.
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pSi (a
S(e¯)) > pIi (c(e¯))) is that the access prices a
S
i (e¯) under separation are at
least as high as the retail prices pIi (c(e¯)) under integration. This follows from
the first-order condition for equilibrium retail pricing under separation, since
it implies that εii > 1, ∀i. This suﬃcient condition is recorded as observation
1.
Observation 1 For the retail prices to be higher under separation than un-
der integration, it is suﬃcient that the access prices under separation are at
least as high as the retail prices under integration, i.e.
aSi (e¯) ≥ pIi (c(e¯))⇒ pSi (aS(e¯)) > pIi (c(e¯)), ∀i.
We shall now show that under reasonable assumption on demand, the
access charges under vertical separation are in fact at least as high as the
retail prices under vertical integration.14 In order to do so, the following
Lemma is helpful.
Lemma 2 Suppose that there is a unique interior equilibrium in retail prices
characterized by the vector pS. Then
0 ≤ mji < mii ≤ 1, i, j = 1, ..., n, i 6= j.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 confirms our initial intuition that in equilibrium, downstream
firms only partially pass on changes of access prices to their costumers. Using
(1) and (5) and applying Observation 1 as well as Lemma 2, we can now
establish our first main result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that vertical separation does not reduce the pricing
externalities between market i and j, j 6= i. In addition, suppose one of the
following conditions is satisfied:
(i) εii is nonincreasing in p;
(ii) εii is nondecreasing in p and the products are close substitutes.
14Observe that for general demand functions, a direct comparison of pSi (a
S(e¯)) and
pIi (c(e¯)) using (1) and (3) is impossible.
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Then for any given eﬀort level e¯, retail prices are higher under vertical sep-
aration than under integration, i.e. pSi (a
S(e¯)) > pIi (c(e¯)), ∀i.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of Proposition 1 closely follows the above description of first-
order condition (5). Vertical separation eliminates the direct link between the
pricing of the upstream monopolist and the demand for the final good and
introduces an indirect transmission mechanism. By imposing that vertical
separation does not reduce the pricing externalities between markets, i.e.
E2(p
S, aS) is not smaller than the second term in (1),15 it is suﬃcient to
consider the eﬀects of vertical separation on the perceived price elasticity
of demand in each market. Since εij < 0 and mji ≥ 0, ∀j 6= i, E1(pS, aS)
is larger than 1/εii(pI), and hence the access price under separation must
be larger than the retail price under integration for given marginal cost.
Of course, the level of marginal cost is not exogenous but depends on the
endogenous choice of eﬀort. We shall study this choice of eﬀort in the next
section.
4.2 Choice of Eﬀort
Let us now analyze the incentives to invest in cost reductions. Consider the
first-order conditions (2) and (6) for equilibrium choice of eﬀort. Observe
that in both market configurations, the equilibrium eﬀort e∗ chosen by the
upstream monopolist satisfies a similar condition of the form
−c0(e∗)D(p∗) = ψ0(e∗). (7)
15This condition is suﬃcient (but not necessary) to assure that the lower perceived
price elasticity of demand in market i unequivocally increasing the retail price pi is not
dominated by potentially countervailing eﬀects from reduced pricing externalities between
markets. Our analysis of a simple example will illustrate that this condition is less severe
than it might appear at first sight, since for several demand systems, such as the linear,
the CES and the Logit, the cross-price elasticities of downstream prices mji,mki, j, k 6= i
will turn out to be zero, and the own-price elasticity mii will be equal to one (see section
7).
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If the equilibrium retail prices were the same both under integration and
separation, i.e. p∗ = pI = pS, the equilibrium e∗ eﬀort would have to be the
same in both market configurations. However, since for a given level of eﬀort
the equilibrium retail prices are higher under separation (see Proposition 1)
and D(p) is decreasing in p, the equilibrium eﬀort e∗ must be smaller under
separation than under integration. As a consequence, the marginal cost of the
upstream monopolist c(eS) is higher under separation than under integration
c(eI). The next Proposition summarizes our second main result.
Proposition 2 Suppose the assumptions of Proposition 1 hold.
Then the network’s marginal cost is lower under vertical integration than
under separation, i.e. c(eI) < c(eS).
Here, a similar intuition applies as for Lemma 1 for vertical integration.
Given the assumptions of Proposition 1, retail prices are higher under sepa-
ration than under integration. As a consequence, aggregate demand for the
intermediate good is smaller under separation, and hence the incentive to
invest in cost reductions is also smaller. Observe that this result reinforces
higher retail prices under vertical separation, since the markup of the access
price ai is now based on higher marginal cost.
5 Liberalization
In the case of liberalization the upstream monopolist is also operating in
the downstream market. To simplify, assume that the upstream monopolist
operates only one firm downstream, namely firm 1 (see Fig. 1). Of course,
the pricing rule of the competing downstream firms remains unaltered, but
now demand is evaluated at a diﬀerent set of retail prices pL = (pL1 , ..., pLn).
The equilibrium retail prices pLi of the competing downstream firms thus
satisfy the following first-order condition
pLi − aLi
pLi
= −
Di
¡
pL
¢
∂D/∂pi · pLi
≡ 1εii(pL)
, i = 2, ..., n, (8)
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with εii(pL) denoting the own-price-elasticity of demand for firm i’s services.
The network operator’s problem is given by
max
p1,aˆ,e
ΠU(p1, aˆ, e) = [p1 − c(e)]D1(p1,pL−1(aˆ))
+
X
i6=1
[ai − c (e)]Di(p1,pL−1(aˆ))− ψ (e)− F,
where pL−1 is the vector of downstream competitors’ retail prices and aˆ =
(a2, ..., an) denotes the vector of access prices under liberalization.16 The
first-order condition for the equilibrium retail price in market 1 is then given
by
pL1 − c(eL)
pL1
=
1
ε11(pL)
−
P
j 6=1[a
L
j − c(eL)]Dj(pL)εj1(pL)
R1(pL)ε11(pL)
. (9)
Equilibrium access prices satisfy the first-order condition
aLi − c
¡
eL
¢
aLi
= E1(p
L,aL) + Eˆ2(p
L, aL) + E3(p
L, aL) (10)
with i = 2, ..., n, j, k = 1, ..., n, and
E1(p
L, aL) =
1P
j εij(pL)mji(aL)
denoting the inverse price elasticity of demand for a monopolist serving mar-
ket i only,
Eˆ2(p
L, aL) = −
P
j 6=i,j 6=1[a
L
j − c(eL)]Dj(pL)
P
k 6=1 εjk(pL)mki(aL)
R˜i(pL)
P
j 6=1 εij(pL)mji(aL)
denoting the pricing externalities to markets j 6= i, 1, and
E3(p
L, aL) = −
£
pL1 − c(eL)
¤
D1(p
L)
P
k 6=1 ε1k(pL)mki(aL)
R˜i(pL)
P
j 6=1 εij(pL)mji(aL)
,
16Note that thanks to vertical integration, downstream firm 1 now has a first-mover
advantage since its price pL1 is set in the first stage, whereas the downstream competitors
set their retail prices pLi , i 6= 1, in the second stage.
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the pricing externalities to market 1. Equilibrium eﬀort is given by the
standard rule
−c0(eL)D(pL) = ψ0(eL). (11)
Note that for vertical separation, two first-order conditions are needed to
characterize the upstream monopolist’s behavior, whereas three first-order
conditions are needed for liberalization. Consider the integrated downstream
firm’s retail price. Equation (9) indicates that the retail price in market 1
is coordinated with the access prices set in all other markets j 6= 1 and
therefore internalizes the externalities between markets. The access prices,
in turn, are set according to (10) which is very similar to (5), in particular
with respect to E1(·), i.e. the inverse price elasticity of demand in market
i. The diﬀerence between these two conditions thus mainly concerns the
pricing externalities between markets: E3(pL, aL) on the right-hand side of
(10) accounts for the fact that under liberalization, the monopolist can set the
retail price rather than the access price in market 1. Finally, (11) indicates
that the monopolist’s eﬀort is set according to the same rule as under vertical
integration.17
To compare this market outcome with vertical integration, we proceed
just as for vertical separation. First, we study suﬃcient conditions for (i)
each access price aLi being higher than the corresponding retail price p
I
i un-
der integration, and (ii) pL1 being higher than p
I
1. Second, we study the
incentive to exert a cost reducing eﬀort. We then discuss the comparison of
liberalization with vertical separation.
5.1 Liberalization v. Integration
To begin with, consider equilibrium retail prices. Using (1), (10) and Propo-
sition 1, it is straightforward to derive our next result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that liberalization does not reduce the pricing exter-
nalities between market i and j, j 6= i. In addition, suppose εii is nonincreas-
ing in p.
17Of course, all of these terms also need to be evaluated at diﬀerent access and retail
prices compared to vertical separation and integration.
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Then for any given eﬀort level e¯, retail prices are higher under liberalization
than under integration, i.e. pLi > p
I
i , ∀i.
Proof. See Appendix.
Comparison of Proposition 3 and Proposition 1 demonstrates that in or-
der to have retail prices at least as high under liberalization as under vertical
integration, the own-price elasticity of demand εii(·) must satisfy a more re-
strictive condition under liberalization than under separation. In the case of
separation, both nonincreasing and nondecreasing elasticities were allowed,
whereas in case of liberalization only nonincreasing elasticities are allowed.
This result reflects the fact that under liberalization, the upstream monopo-
list has an incentive to set a relatively low retail price in market 1 in order to
divert demand from his downstream competitors to generate higher demand
for the good that is produced with lower marginal cost (due to the absence
of double marginalization). This incentive is absent under vertical separa-
tion, where the monopolist sets its access prices exclusively according to the
price elasticities of demand, accounting for the pricing externalities between
markets. We shall discuss this issue in the next section in more detail.
Consider now the incentive to exert eﬀort under liberalization. Since the
relevant first-order condition (11) has the same form as the first-order condi-
tions under integration and separation, an analogous argument as above can
be applied. Given that the assumptions of Proposition 3 holds, equilibrium
retail prices are higher under liberalization than under integration for any
given eﬀort level e¯. Hence, the equilibrium eﬀort under liberalization must
be smaller than under integration. Proposition 4 summarizes this result.
Proposition 4 Suppose the assumptions of Proposition 3 hold.
Then the network’s marginal cost is lower under vertical integration than
under liberalization, i.e. c(eI) < c(eL).
We now proceed to a more detailed comparison of liberalization with
vertical separation.
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5.2 Liberalization v. Separation
We have pointed out above that under liberalization, the upstream monop-
olist has an incentive to divert demand from his downstream competitors
to market 1 to generate higher demand for the good that is produced with
lower marginal cost. This can be established by setting a relatively low re-
tail price in market 1, or by setting relatively high access prices for all other
markets. Evidently, both strategies place the separated downstream rivals
at a competitive disadvantage. When studying a particular market outcome,
however, the broad notion of “placing competitors at a disadvantage” is not
suﬃciently precise. One needs to distinguish between discrimination that is
truly anticompetitive and discrimination that harms rivals precisely because
it is competitive (see Klass and Salinger 1995, 677). The bulk of the recent
literature on vertical foreclosure18 therefore argues, starting from the notion
of raising rivals’ cost (Salop and Scheﬀman 1983), that an integrated firm
acts anticompetitively only when increasing rivals’ cost, but not when cutting
the cost of its own downstream subsidiaries.
When comparing liberalization and separation, we follow this distinction
and say that there is vertical foreclosure if and only if the access charge
in market i is higher under liberalization than under separation, i.e. aLi >
aSi , i = 2, ..., n. Of course, the level of the retail price p
L
1 remains important
since it is needed to evaluate demand and the relevant elasticities. Inspection
of the first-order conditions (10) and (5) indicates that for small changes of
the relevant elasticities with changes in retail prices, the diﬀerence in the level
of access prices under liberalization and separation is largely determined by
the pricing externalities. Unfortunately, a direct comparison of the role that
these externalities play in the two market configurations is very complicated
with general demand functions.19 Therefore, we confine ourselves to show
that the monopolist’s pricing behavior under liberalization will generally be
diﬀerent from that under separation. We will study the diﬀerent market
equilibria using specific functional forms for the demand system in section 7.
18See e.g. Riordan (1998), Sibley and Weisman (1998) and Ordover et al. (1990).
19Or, as Shapiro (1989, 348) puts it (without considering vertical issues): “With n firms,
it is diﬃcult to say much more about diﬀerentiated-product pricing equilibria without
further assumptions about the demand system”.
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To see that the monopolist’s pricing behavior under liberalization must
be diﬀerent from that under separation, suppose the contrary, i.e. assume
that for a given eﬀort level e¯, the integrated monopolist sets all access prices
aL = aS, as well as pL1 = p
S
1 in market 1. The first-order conditions (8) and (3)
then imply that pL = pS. Now consider the first-order conditions (10) and (5)
for equilibrium access pricing. Since the elasticities εij and mji are evaluated
at the same prices both under liberalization and separation, the inverse of
the price elasticities in market i are equal, i.e. E1(pL, aL)
¯¯
pL=pS ,aL=aS
=
E1(p
S, aS). Now consider the other terms. Since pS1 > a
S
1 , it follows that
Eˆ2(p
L, aL)
¯¯¯
pL=pS ,aL=aS
+ E3(p
L, aL)
¯¯
pL=pS ,aL=aS
> E2(p
S, aS).
This in turn implies that aLi > a
S
i , hence a contradiction. Our next observa-
tion summarizes this result.
Observation 2 The monopolist’s pricing behavior under liberalization is gen-
erally diﬀerent from that under vertical separation.
Naturally, by itself observation 2 does not predict whether vertical fore-
closure does emerge in equilibrium. We will study this issue in more detail
in section 7.2.
6 Welfare Eﬀects of Market Structure Changes
So far, we have determined the levels of retail prices and eﬀort under integra-
tion, separation and liberalization. Let us now study how aggregate welfare
is aﬀected by a change in the industry’s vertical structure. To compare ag-
gregate welfare in the diﬀerent regimes, we apply a useful result provided by
Varian (1985). Let us follow the common assumption that aggregate welfare
W is measured by the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus and that
the demand functions Di, i = 1, ..., n, for the final products are generated
by quasi-linear utility. Consider an initial set of prices p0 = (p01, ..., p
0
n) and
another set of prices p1 = (p11, ..., p
1
n). Let C
0 = c(e(p0))D(p0) + F and
C1 = c(e(p1))D(p1) +F denote the total cost of production associated with
p0 and p1. Finally, let ∆D = D(p1) −D(p0) denote the vector of changes
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in demand and let ∆C = C1 − C0 denote the change in the total cost of
production. The change in welfare, ∆W , associated with the transition from
p0 and p1 then satisfies the following condition20
p0∆D−∆C ≥ ∆W. (12)
Using the cost and demand structure outlined above, (12) can also be written
as £
p0i − c(e(p0))
¤X
i
∆Di −
£
c(e(p1))− c(e(p0))
¤X
i
Di(p
1) ≥ ∆W. (13)
We can use (13) to evaluate the welfare changes implied by changes of verti-
cal market structure. Consider the welfare change associated with the price
change from p0 under integration to p1 under separation. According to
Proposition 2, marginal cost increases with a change from integration to sep-
aration, i.e. the second term on the left hand side is negative. Equation (13)
therefore indicates that an increase in output is a necessary condition for
welfare to increase (∆W > 0). This condition cannot be satisfied, however,
since retail prices increase according to Proposition 1, and output must thus
decrease (see assumption [A 2]). As a result, a change from vertical inte-
gration to separation is welfare decreasing under the assumptions mentioned
above. A similar argument holds for the comparison of vertical integration
and liberalization, using Proposition 3 and 4 instead of Proposition 1 and
2. Therefore, a change from vertical integration to liberalization is also wel-
fare decreasing under the assumptions mentioned above. The welfare conse-
quences of a change from vertical separation to liberalization, however, are
ambiguous for general demand functions.
20Proof: See Varian (1985, 872).
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7 A Simple Example with Linear Demand
To explore the pricing behavior under the various market configurations in
more detail, let us study an example with a linear demand system given by
Di(p) = αi − βipi + γ
X
j 6=i
pj, i, j = 1, ..., n,
with αi, βi > 0 as demand parameters and γ > 0 denoting the substitutability
between products.21 ,22 Let us assume for the moment that these parameters
satisfy assumptions [A 1] to [A 3].23 To simplify, assume that αi ≡ α and βi ≡
β, ∀i, i.e. we consider symmetric demand functions only. Using this demand
system, explicit solutions for both access and retail prices can be obtained.
We start by comparing the market outcomes under vertical integration and
separation. We then move on to a comparison of vertical separation with
liberalization which will allow us to check whether vertical foreclosure as
defined above emerges in equilibrium. Note that we abstract from eﬀort
considerations during these comparisons.
7.1 Integration v. Separation
Consider the integrated monopolist. Substituting the specific demand func-
tions into the relevant first-order condition (1), imposing symmetry and solv-
ing for the retail price yields
pIi =
α+ (β − γ (n− 1)) c
2 (β − γ(n− 1)) . (14)
Compare this with the situation under vertical separation. Here, substituting
the specific functional forms into the first-order conditions (3) and (5) and
21With γ = 0 each downstream firm (division, respectively) is a monopolist.
22See Häckner (2000) for a recent analysis of the Bertrand equilibrium with diﬀerentiated
goods assuming such a demand system. However, he does not consider vertical issues.
23We will need to make sure that these assumptions are satisfied when simulating the
market outcomes with specific parameter values.
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solving for the respective prices yields a best-response function
pbi(ai) =
α+ βai
2β − γ(n− 1)
for the retail price, and another one for the access price which we define as
abi(pi).
24 Tedious calculations then show that in equilibrium access and retail
prices are given by
aSi =
α+ (β − γ (n− 1)) c
2 (β − γ(n− 1)) (15)
and
pSi =
1
2
3αβ + cβ2 − γ(2α+ cβ)(n− 1)
2β2 + γ2 + γ(γn− 3β)(n− 1)
(16)
Inspection of these explicit solutions reveals that the access price under sep-
aration is just equal to the retail price under integration, i.e. aSi = p
I
i .
This result emerges because for the simple symmetric demand system con-
sidered here, all cross-price elasticities of the downstream prices are zero
(mji,mki = 0,∀j, k 6= i), and the own-price elasticity turns out to be one
(mii = 1). Hence, retail prices are higher under separation which implies
that the monopolist’s profit is larger under integration for a given level of
eﬀort.25 A network monopolist will thus not voluntarily separate upstream
from downstream operations.
Fig. 2 illustrates the equilibrium prices under integration and separation
as a function of n, the number of downstream firms, using the following
specific numerical values for the demand parameters
α = 10;β = 1; γ = 0.1; c = 0.
Note that these parameter values satisfy assumptions [A 1] to [A 3] for n <
10.26
24This best-response function is a complicated polynomial of the demand parameters
that we are not detailing here.
25Observe that pIiD(p
I) > aSi D(p
S).
26To see this, consider each assumption in turn:
[A 1 ] ∂Di(p)/∂pi = −1 < 0, ∂Di(p)/∂pj = 0.1 > 0, ∂2Di(p)/∂p2i = 0.
[A 2 ] ∂D(p)/∂pi = −1 + n · (0.1) < 0 for n < 10.
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Figure 2: Integration v. Separation (α = 10; β = 1; γ = 0.1; c = 0)
7.2 Separation v. Liberalization
Consider the behavior of the vertically separated downstream firms under
liberalization. Substituting the specific demand functions into first-order
condition (8), imposing symmetry and solving for the retail price yields
pi(p1, ai) =
α+ p1γ + βai
2β − γ (n− 2) . (17)
Similar transformations of (9) yield the profit maximizing retail price
p1(ai, pi) =
1
2
α+ γ (ai − c+ pi) (n− 1) + cβ
β
for the vertically integrated firm. Finally, as for vertical separation, there
is a complicated function ai(p1, pi) for the optimal access price under liber-
[A 3 ] (i)
P
j (∂Di(p)/∂pj) (∂pj/∂ai) = ∂Di(p)/∂pi = −1 < 0;
(ii)
P
k,j 6=i (∂Dj(p)/∂pk) (∂pk/∂ai) = ∂Dj(p)/∂pi = 0.1 > 0.
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alization. Solving this system of equations yields intricate explicit solutions
for the respective prices in terms of the models parameters. To compare the
equilibria under separation and liberalization, we graph the respective prices
using the same numerical values for the demand parameters as above.
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Figure 3: Separation vs. Liberalization (α = 10; β = 1; γ = 0.1; c = 0)
Fig. 3 indicates that with the simple demand system used here, verti-
cal foreclosure does not emerge in equilibrium.27 While it is true that the
vertically integrated upstream monopolist is able to place his downstream
competitors at a competitive disadvantage (pL1 < p
L
i ), it is not attaining this
result by increasing its rivals’ access prices relative to separation.28 It rather
reduces the integrated downstream firm’s retail price pL1 strongly enough so
that the downstream rivals cannot keep up even though they now face lower
access prices. As a result, the retail prices under liberalization remain strictly
27Naturally, the prices given in Fig. 2 and 3 depend on the specific parameter values, in
particular on the level of substitutability between products given by γ. Simulations with
γ < 0.1, however, yield similar qualitive results even though the price curves are ‘flatter’.
28The bold dashed curve indicating aLi is everywhere below the dahsed curve indicating
aSi .
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lower than those under vertical separation (pLi < p
S
i ,∀i). This simple exam-
ple demonstrates that a vertically integrated monopolist may desire to reduce
its downstream competitors’ costs rather than raising them, even if access
prices can be set freely. This result nicely complements Sibley and Weisman
(1998) who find that a regulated upstream monopolist may have an incentive
to reduce the downstream rivals’ cost under Cournot competition.
Interestingly, the retail prices pLi under liberalization are even smaller
than the retail prices under integration for n large enough, i.e. the eﬀect
of introducing competition is strong enough to outweigh the problems asso-
ciated with the partial vertical separation of the industry when n is large.
As a result, changing the vertical structure to liberalization may not only be
welfare increasing when starting from vertical separation, but also when start-
ing from vertical integration when there are many competitors. Conversely,
breaking up a dominant integrated firm subject to imperfect downstream
competition may be diﬃcult to justify.
Consider a simplified version of the Microsoft case for an illustration of
the latter statement. Suppose Microsoft is the sole provider of PC operating
systems and its browser Internet Explorer (IE) competes in the downstream
market with Netscape (NS). In the context of the model discussed above, the
industry is thus in a state of liberalization. Note that it is optimal for Mi-
crosoft to eliminate a potential double marginalization within its vertically
integrated structure, e.g. by selling the operating system for the monopoly
price and giving away IE for free. In practice, this is established by bundling
the operating system and IE. As a result, there is an intense competitive
pressure on NS. In this situation, the breakup of Microsoft and the associ-
ated unbundling of the operating system from IE would probably lead to the
regulatory imposition of a double markup that not only increases the prof-
itability of providing NS and IE, but also the retail prices. As a result, social
welfare would be reduced. From a static welfare point of view, a breakup of
Microsoft thus appears to be undesirable.29
29See Economides (2001) for a recent survey of the Microsoft case.
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8 Concluding Remarks
The above analysis suggests that if an integrated network industry’s final
products are highly diﬀerentiated, changing the industry’s vertical struc-
ture from integration to separation or liberalization is detrimental to social
welfare if not supplemented by adequate access or retail price regulation.
Consequently, the phasing out of “residual regulation” in deregulated indus-
tries targeted by some policy makers seems to be a sensible practice if and
only if there is fierce downstream competition and vertical foreclosure can
be safely excluded. In addition, the analysis indicates that breaking up a
dominant integrated firm subject to imperfect downstream competition –
such as Microsoft – is hard to justify on the grounds of static eﬃciency. An-
titrust authorities should therefore attempt to evaluate whether the breakup
of a dominating firm would generate higher dynamic eﬃciency. Overall, the
model presented in this paper demonstrates that deregulation and divesture
in network industries should be guided by a careful analysis of the pros and
cons specific to the network industries’ characteristics.
There is ample scope for further research. First, we focussed on cost re-
ducing upstream investment by the network monopolist and did not consider
other types of downstream or upstream investment, e.g. investment in net-
work quality or advertisement for the final product. Second, we abstracted
from the fact that an integrated dominant firm’s incentive to foreclose its
downstream competitors by price discrimination will probably depend on its
costs relative to non-price discrimination or sabotage. Allowing for diﬀer-
ent types of vertical foreclosure might prove to be instructive. Finally, the
analysis presented here could be adapted to study the eﬀects generated by
the entry of downstream competitors with higher eﬃciency.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Totally diﬀerentiating (1) and (2) yields"
2
∂Di
∂pIi
+ [pi − c(e)]
∂2Di
∂ (pIi )
2 +
X
j 6=i
[pj − c(e)]
∂2Dj
∂ (pIi )
2
#
| {z }
<0 (SOC)
dpIi (A1)
+
"
−c0(e)∂Di∂pIi
−
X
j 6=i
c0(e)
∂Dj
∂pIi
#
| {z }
<0 (by assumption [A 2])
deI = 0
and"
−c0(e)∂Di∂pIi
−
X
j 6=i
c0(e)
∂Dj
∂pIi
#
| {z }
<0 (by assumption [A 2])
dpIi +
"
−c00(e)
X
i
Di − ψ00(e)
#
| {z }
<0 (SOC)
deI = 0. (A2)
Adding (A1) and (A2) and solving yields deI/dpIi < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall the following definitions of the retail price
elasticities with respect to the access charge ai:
mii ≡
(∂pi/∂ai) ai
pi
; mji ≡
(∂pj/∂ai) ai
pj
.
We first derive 0 < mii ≤ 1. Then we show that 0 ≤ mji < mii to prove
Lemma 2.
To begin with, consider mii. The first-order condition for equilibrium
retail pricing under vertical separation is
∂Πi(p, ai)
∂pi
= Di(p) +
¡
pSi − ai
¢ ∂Di (p)
∂pi
= 0. (A3)
Total diﬀerentiation then yields
dpSi
dai
=
∂Di/∂pi
2(∂Di/∂p) + (pSi − ai) (∂2Di/∂p2i )
> 0.
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Substituting this result for ∂pi/∂ai, we get
mii =
(∂Di/∂pi) ai
[2(∂Di/∂p) + (pSi − ai) (∂2Di/∂p2i )] pi
.
Transforming yields (using the first-order condition (A3))
mii =
εii + 1
2εii + ρii
with εii ≡ − (∂Di/∂pi)piDi > 0 and ρii ≡
(∂2Di/∂p2i )pi
(∂Di/∂pi) , where ρii is the elasticity of
the demand elasticity εii. Now, clearly mii ≤ 1 for
εii + 1 ≤ 2εii + ρii,
or
ρii ≥ 1− εii, (A4)
respectively. (A4) is satisfied in equilibrium if demand is not too convex (i.e.
if ρii is not too negative). Also, mii > 0 requires
2εii + ρii > 0,
or
ρii > −2εii, (A5)
respectively. Note that (A5) is generally satisfied if (A4) holds, i.e. we have
0 < mii ≤ 1 for demand not too convex (see [A 1]).
Let us now turn to mji. Solving the first-order condition (A3) for the
price in market j for pj and writing the retail price as a function of the
vector of access charges a yields
pSj (a) = aj −
Dj(p(a))
∂Dj(p(a))/∂pj
. (A6)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to ai and simplifying yields (using the first-order
condition (A3))
dpSj
dai
= −(∂Dj/∂pi) (∂pi/∂ai)
(∂Dj/∂pj)
.
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Substituting this result for ∂pj/∂ai, we get
mji = −
(∂Dj/∂pi) (∂pi/∂ai) ai
(∂Dj/∂pj) pi
≥ 0.
Transforming yields
mji = −
(∂Dj/∂pi)mii
(∂Dj/∂pj)
≥ 0 (A7)
with 0 < mii ≤ 1 as shown above. By assumption [A 2], it now follows
immediately that 0 ≤ mji < mii ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Using Observation 1 as well as the first-order
conditions (5) and (1), retail prices are higher under vertical separation than
integration if
1P
j εij(pS)mji(aS)
−
P
j 6=i
£
aSj − c(e¯)
¤
Dj(p
S)
P
k εjk(pS)mki(aS)
R˜i(pS)
P
j εij(pS)mji(aS)
(A8)
≥
1
εii(pI)
−
P
j 6=i
¡
pIj − c(e¯)
¢
Dj(p
I)εji(pI)
Ri(pI)εii(pI)
,∀i, j.
Since, by assumption, vertical separation does not reduce the pricing exter-
nalities to markets j 6= i, we know that
−
P
j 6=i
£
aSj − c(e¯)
¤
Dj(p
S)
P
k εjk(pS)mki(aS)
R˜i(pS)
P
j εij(pS)mji(aS)
(A9)
≥
−
P
j 6=i
¡
pIj − c(e¯)
¢
Dj(p
I)εji(pI)
Ri(pI)εii(pI)
,∀i, j.
To proof the claim that retail prices are higher under vertical separation than
integration, it is therefore suﬃcient to show that
1P
j εij(pS)mji(aS)
>
1
εii(pI)
, i, j = 1, ..., n (A10)
for εii nonincreasing and nondecreasing in retail prices.
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(i) If εii is nonincreasing in the vector of retail prices, the claim follows
immediately from εii > 0, εij < 0 for all j 6= i, and Lemma 2.
(ii) If εii is nondecreasing in the vector of retail prices, εii > 0, εij < 0 for
all j 6= i, and Lemma 2 still work in the right direction but are not suﬃcient
to guarantee that (A10) is satisfied. In addition, we need that the final goods
are close substitutes, since then there is only a small diﬀerence between pI
and pS. Then the claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is very similar to the proof of
Proposition 1. Using (10), (9) and (1), the retail prices pL under liberaliza-
tion are higher than the retail prices pI under integration if
1P
j εij(pL)mji(aL)
(A11)
−
P
j 6=i,j 6=1[a
L
j − c(e¯)]Dj(pL)
P
k 6=1 εjk(pL)mki(aL)
R˜i(pL)
P
j 6=1 εij(pL)mji(aL)
−
£
pL1 − c(e¯)
¤
D1(p
L)
P
k 6=1 ε1k(pL)mki(aL)
R˜i(pL)
P
j 6=1 εij(pL)mji(aL)
≥
1
εii(pI)
−
P
j 6=i[p
I
j − c(e¯)]Dj(pI)εji(pI)
Ri(pI)εii(pI)
and
1
ε11(pL)
−
P
j 6=1[a
L
j − c(e¯)]Djεj1(pL)
R1ε11(pL)
(A12)
>
1
ε11(pI)
−
P
j 6=1[a
I
j − c(e¯)]Djεj1(pI)
R1ε11(pI)
with i = 2, ..., n, , j, k = 1, ..., n. Since, by assumption, liberalization does
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not reduce the pricing externalities to markets j 6= i, we know that
−
P
j 6=i,j 6=1[a
L
j − c(e¯)]Dj(pL)
P
k 6=1 εjk(pL)mki(aL)
R˜i(pL)
P
j 6=1 εij(pL)mji(aL)
(A13)
−
£
pL1 − c(e¯)
¤
D1(p
L)
P
k 6=1 ε1k(pL)mki(aL)
R˜i(pL)
P
j 6=1 εij(pL)mji(aL)
≥
−
P
j 6=1[a
I
j − c(e¯)]Dj(pI)εj1(pI)
R1(pI)ε11(pI)
.
and
−
P
j 6=1[a
L
j − c(e¯)]Dj(pL)εj1(pL)
R1(pL)ε11(pL)
≥ −
P
j 6=1[a
I
j − c(e¯)]Dj(pI)εj1(pI)
R1(pI)ε11(pI)
.
(A14)
It is therefore suﬃcient to show that both
1P
j εij(pL)mji(aL)
≥ 1εii(pI)
, ∀i, j (A15)
and
1
ε11(pL)
≥ 1ε11(pI)
. (A16)
are satisfied. If εii is nonincreasing in the vector of retail prices, the claim
follows immediately from εii > 0, εij < 0 for all j 6= i, and Lemma 2.
33
10 References
Buehler, S., Schmutzler, A., Benz, M.A. (2000): Quality Provision in Deregu-
lated Industries: The Railtrack Problem. Working paper No. 0002
of the Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich.
Economides, N. (2001): “TheMicrosoft Antitrust Case”, Journal of Industry,
Competition and Trade, forthcoming.
Greenhut, M.L., Ohta, H. (1978): “Related Market Conditions and In-
terindustrial Mergers: Reply”, American Economic Review, 68,
228-230.
Greenhut, M.L., Ohta, H. (1976): “Related Market Conditions and In-
terindustrial Mergers”, American Economic Review, 66, 267-277.
Häckner, J. (2000): “A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Diﬀer-
entiated Oligopolies”, Journal of Economic Theory, 93, 233-239.
Haring, J.R., Kaserman, D.L. (1978): “Related Market Conditions and In-
terindustrial Mergers: Comment”, American Economic Review, 68,
225-227.
Klass, M.W., Salinger, M.A. (1995): “Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclo-
sure Provide Sound Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical
Merger Cases?”, Antitrust Bulletin, Fall 1995, 667-698.
Laﬀont, J.J., Tirole, J. (1996): “Creating Competition Through Interconnec-
tion: Theory and Practice”, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10,
227-256.
Lee, S.H., Hamilton J.H. (1999): “Using Market Structure to Regulate a Ver-
tically Integrated Monopolist”, Journal of Regulatory Economics,
15, 223-248.
Mandy, D.M., Sappington, D.E.M. (2000): “Incentives for Sabotage in Verti-
cally-Related Industries”, University of Florida (mimeo).
Newbery, D.M. (1997): “Privatisation and liberalisation of network utilities”,
European Economic Review, 41, 1357-383.
Ordover, J.A., Saloner, G., Salop, S.C. (1990): “Equilibrium Vertical Fore-
closure”, American Economic Review, 80, 127-142.
Perry, M.K. (1989): “Vertical Integration: Determinants and Eﬀects”, in:
Schmalensee, R., Willig, R.D. (eds.): Handbook of Industrial Orga-
nization, Vol. 1, 183-255.
Perry, M.K. (1978): “Related Market Conditions and Interindustrial Mergers:
Comment”, American Economic Review, 68, 221-224.
34
Rey, P., Stiglitz, J. (1995): “The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producer’s
Competition”, Rand Journal of Economics, 26, 431-451.
Riordan, M (1998): “Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant
Firm”, American Economic Review, 88, 1232-1248.
Salop, S.C., Scheﬀman, D.T. (1983): “Raising Rivals’ Cost”, American Eco-
nomic Review Papers and Proceedings, 73, 267-271.
Shapiro, C. (1989): “Theories of Oligopoly Behavior”, in: Schmalensee, R.,
Willig, R.D. (eds.): Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1,
329-414.
Sibley, D., Weisman, D.L. (1998): “Raising Rivals’ Costs: The Entry of
an Upstream Monopolist Into Downstream Markets”, Information
Economics and Policy, 10, 451-470.
Spengler, J. (1950): “Vertical Integration and Anti-trust Policy”, Journal of
Political Economy, 58, 347-352.
Tirole, J. (1988): The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts.
Varian, H.R. (1985): “Price Discrimination and Social Welfare”, American
Economic Review, 75, 870-875.
Vickers, J. (1995): “Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Mar-
kets”, Review of Economic Studies, 62, 1-17.
35
Mail or fax orders: Name and address:
Sozialökonomisches Institut
Bibliothek (Working Papers)
Rämistrasse 71
CH-8006 Zürich
Fax +41-1-634 49 82
The Working Papers of the Socioeconomic Institute can be downloaded in PDF-format from http://www.soi.unizh.ch
Working Papers of the Socioeconomic Institute at the University of Zurich
9904 Network Competition under Asymmetric Interconnection Regulations: 
Lessons from the Swiss Case
Stefan Bühler
1999, 24 p. Fr. 10.-
9905 Multilaterale Investitionsabkommen - Lernen aus dem MAI?
Andreas Polk
1999, 32S. Fr. 10.-
9906 Innovation and the Emergence of Market Dominance,
Susan Athey and Armin Schmutzler
1999, 42S. Fr. 10.-
0001 Is Swiss Telecommunications a Natural Monopoly?
An Evaluation of Empirical Evidence
Stefan Bühler
2000, 23 S. Fr. 10.-
0002 Quality Provision in Deregulated Industries:
The Railtrack Problem
M.A. Benz, S. Bühler, A. Schmutzler
2000, 32 S. Fr. 10.-
0003 Measuring Willingness-To-Pay for Risk Reduction:
An Application of Conjoint Analysis
Harry Telser, Peter Zweifel
2000, 21 S. Fr. 10.-
0101 Empirische Analyse des Zeitpunktes schweizerischer
Direktinvestitionen in Osteuropa
2001, 26 S. Fr. 10.-
0102 How to Regulate Vertical Market Structure in Network Industries
Stefan Buehler
2001, 35 S. Fr. 10.-
